Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2018
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Ege Univ, Fac Economics & Admin Sciences
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
This article investigates corporate tax payoffs in a repeated game theory approach. An application of mixed strategy infinitely repeated game for corporate tax payoffs is provided with four payment types included under new draft tax procedural law. The Folk Theorem is used to find SPNE of infinitely repeated game strategies. The results demonstrate that: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linear and that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2) Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both are not appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixed strategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates in order to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTP will prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possible request settlement when get caught for evading tax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectors and audit rates must be increased to break the courage of CTP evading tax.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Repeated games, business tax, tax evasion, tax law
Kaynak
Ege Academic Review
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
18
Sayı
2
